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Abstract 
 
In most democracies voting Advice Applications (VAAs) advising citizens which candidate or party 
they should vote for become more and more popular. It is therefore crucial to know more about the 
functioning and the effects of such tools. After some general remarks about the spread of these tools 
and their possible effects gathered so far in various studies, this paper presents the latest results from a 
research conducted in the course of the 2011 Swiss national elections. They confirm that VAAs can 
lead to better informed voters and are likely to have a positive impact on electoral turnout. 
Additionally it can be shown that the Swiss VAA smartvote made voters change their voting intention 
and that they voted for a different party. This was particularly advantageous for the Green Liberal 
Party. At the moment, only a minority of voters rely on the voting recommendation by smartvote. This 
might change dramatically with the introduction of e-voting. Once people can vote electronically, 
there are hardly any possibilities to prevent voters from transferring their selection of candidates based 
on the recommendation given by a VAA into the official electronic ballot paper. If this is possible, e-
voting will become more popular than postal voting. 
 
 
 
 
Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) offer help and advice for citizens in deciding which 
party or candidates to vote for in the course of elections. They compare voters’ preferences 
with respect to different political issues with the preferences of parties or candidates and 
indicate those parties or candidates who are politically close. Nowadays, one or several VAAs 
are on offer at practically all national elections in Europe and they are used by millions of 
voters. Given their widespread use it is astonishing that so far political scientists have hardly 
dealt with VAAs and their possible effects on electoral behaviour and election results.  
 
In the course of the 2011 elections of the Swiss national parliament Swiss voters had - 
after 2003 and 2007 - for the third time the possibility to seek voting advice on a VAA called 
smartvote.1 Quite an important number of voters did so. The providers estimate that about 
437’000 voters took this exercise seriously, revealed their political preferences and received a 
voting recommendation. This amounts to about 8.5 per cent of the electorate and a bit more 
than 17.6 per cent of the citizens taking part in the elections.2 
                                                          
1  Additionally, smartvote has also been offered in an important number of cantonal and local elections.  
2  The corresponding figures for the previous elections are 91‘815 or 4.2 per cent of the voters in 2003 and 350‘000 or 14.7 per cent of the 
voters in 2007. 
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After a short introduction into the functioning of VAAs and their theoretical implications 
with respect to voting, I will start by presenting empirical evidence on the use and the impact 
of VAAs on electoral behaviour gathered so far. Then, I will turn my attention more 
specifically to the Swiss case. Since the impact on participation is likely to depend on the 
electoral system, I will first present the Swiss voting systems and the specific characteristics 
of the Swiss VAA called smartvote. Then, I will address the question whether this tool had an 
influence on the results of the 2011 elections and worked in favour of specific parties. This 
will lead us to some more general reflections such as the possibility of linking VAAs with 
electronic voting.  
 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper stems from a research project conducted 
within the framework of a National Center of Competence in Research with the name 
“Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century” (NCCR Democracy) which is funded by the 
Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF).  
 
1. What are VAAs and how do they work? 
VAAs are issue-matching systems. Their basic functions are simple. At first, a catalogue of 
issues reflecting the most important political discussions and problems serves to identify the 
positions of the parties or candidates (for a party election or a personal election respectively). 
These political positions are saved in the form of a profile. As a next step, the website allows 
voters to construct their own profile by means of the same catalogue of issues. This profile 
can then be compared with the profiles of the parties or candidates. The VAAs then calculate 
the congruence between voters and parties or candidates and display the results as rankings. 
All VAAs have this basic system in common. 
 
Online voting aids are thus based on the normative idea of so-called issue voting which 
they implement in an almost ideal fashion (Klein 2006: 595). Issue voting is based on Downs’ 
(1957) spatial model of politics and on his notion that the congruence between voter and party 
or candidate with respect to the essential political issues should be the decisive criterion of an 
election. In its original form, this model assumes that a rational voter will vote for the party 
which is closest to his or her own views. This approach is thus also referred to as proximity 
voting.  
 
The Dutch Stemwijzer3 is generally regarded as the very first voting aid. Its earliest 
version was developed in 1989 in a printed form to be used in teaching politics at school. In 
1994 a first computer-based version was developed and several thousand disks were sold. In 
the forefront of the parliamentary elections in 1998, a first online-version was introduced 
which was used 6,500 times (De Graaf 2010). In Finland, a VAA had been developed 
independently two years earlier. In the following years, new voting aids were added by and 
by, so that no fewer than 20 different online-voting aids were on offer for the parliamentary 
                                                          
3 Cf. http://www.stemwijzer.nl (20.01.2012). 
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elections of 2007 (Ruusuvirta 2010: 47-49). In other European countries a veritable VAA 
boom began in the years following the millennium. Today it is difficult to find a European 
country that does not offer several online voting aids during electoral campaigns.4 Besides a 
multitude of independent websites, three “families” of VAAs can be distinguished:  
 
The Stemwijzer family, based on the Dutch example, is used in many other countries. Its 
best-known representative must be the German Wahl-O-Mat.5 Stemwijzer versions have also 
been employed in France, Italy and Bulgaria. The Stemwijzer is a reliable and simple voting 
aid, characterised by a high degree of user-friendliness. The second family is based on the 
Kieskompas6, also developed in the Netherlands and in direct competition with the 
Stemwijzer. The Kieskompas differs from the Stemwijzer in that the positions of the parties 
with respect to political issues are not identified by means of questioning but rather by means 
of an analysis of the programmes of parties and election campaigns. In addition, the 
Kieskompas makes use of a diagram in a two-dimensional system of coordinates rather than a 
list for the results obtained – in other words it provides a kind of map of the political space. 
This family comprises the EU Profiler7 (a VAA for the EU elections of 2009), the Canadian 
Vote Compass8, the Portuguese Bussola Eleitoral9, a Turkish version10 and the US-American 
Electoral Compass11. 
 
The third family, finally, has its origins in Switzerland. In 2003 smartvote12 began to 
operate and it has since been used in Scotland, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Luxembourg13 and 
Austria14. Smartvote is a relatively complex online-voting aid, containing a simple list 
presentation and two different graphical presentations detailing the party positions. In 
addition, smartvote enables voters to compare their own positions not only with those of the 
parties but also with those of the individual candidates. 
 
Most VAAs have their origins in the context of universities. Scientists interested in 
electoral and party research are often strongly involved. Early on, institutions engaged in 
civic education expressed their interest. They then employed VAAs in the context of 
informing people and as an instrument to strengthen the political participation of young and 
new voters (Fivaz/Nadig 2010). This is typically and ideally the case for the Stemwijzer, the 
Wahl-O-Mat and the Austrian Wahlkabine15. Smartvote works in close conjunction with 
various universities, though it has been developed and operated by a non-profit organisation, 
while Kieskompas is a project of a market-oriented enterprise.  
 
Online voting aids are also employed in new democracies in the context of projects aimed 
at establishing or furthering democracy and as such they are often financed by state agencies 
for cooperative development or by NGOs. This was the case in the transitional countries of 
                                                          
4 A good overview of the rapid expansion of VAAs can be found in Walgrave et al. 2008b as well as in Cedroni/Garzia 2010. 
5 Cf. http://wahl-o-mat.de (22.01.2012). 
6 Cf. http://www.kieskompas.nl (22.01.2012). 
7  Cf. http://www.euprofiler.eu (3.2.2012). 
8 Cf. http://votecompass.ca (3.2.2012). 
9  Cf. http://www.bussolaeleitoral.pt (3.2.2012). 
10 Cf. http://www.oypusulasi.org (3.2.2012). 
11  Cf. http://www.electoralcompass.com (3.2.2012). 
12 Cf. http://www.smartvote.ch (3.2.2012). 
13 Cf. http://www.smartvote.lu (3.2.2012). 
14 Cf. http://www.politikkabine.at (3.2.2012). 
15 Cf. http://www.wahlkabine.at (3.2.2012). 
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Eastern Europe and more recently in certain countries of the Middle East against the 
background of the Arab spring. In 2011, versions of both Stemwijzer and Kieskompas were 
employed in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco.  
 
2. The impact of VAAs16 
In view of the ever increasing use and importance of VAAs it is surprising that the question 
whether they have an influence on the electoral behaviour of their users has only moved to the 
foreground of VAA research in the past two or three years. Indications for such an influence 
have already been visible for some time. In Finland, for instance, before elections VAAs are 
the most important source of information for young voters (Ruusuvirta/Rosema 2009: 2). In 
Switzerland surveys among the users of smartvote show the crucial role of this website with 
regard to the information gathering and processing: 86% of smartvote users have referred to it 
as an important source of information, while other online media were relegated to second 
position with 68% of users; television channels and newspapers jointly took third position 
with 61% each (Ladner et al. 2010: 115). 
 
With respect to the impact on electoral behaviour, three questions can be posed (Garzia 
2010: 23): First, do VAAs change the way in which users get hold of relevant information on 
elections and the way in which they handle this information? Second, do VAAs have an 
impact on electoral participation? And third, finally, do VAAs have a direct influence on the 
electoral decisions of their users and on the election results? 
 
As for the impact on the way in which users get hold of and treat information, the so-
called cognitive effects, several studies arrived at clear and positive results. 
Marschall/Schmidt (2010) showed that in Germany about 60% of people interviewed have 
been stimulated by Wahl-O-Mat to look for further information on the elections in general 
and on the parties and their positions in particular. 70% even claimed to have discussed the 
received voting recommendation with family members or friends. It is of particular interest 
that even among those users who hardly talk about politics, 63% were stimulated by Wahl-O-
Mat to discuss the elections with others (Marshall/Schmidt 2010: 83-84). Comparable figures 
also exist for Switzerland and thus confirm the German results: 55% of Swiss VAA users 
went on to look for further information and 70% were led to discuss the elections with other 
people (Ladner/Pianzola 2010). Besides political knowledge and interest, which is 
strengthened by the use of VAAs (Garzia 2010: 22), it has further been shown that users do 
not accept voting recommendations uncritically (Fivaz/Nadig 2010). Often the voting 
recommendations are simply taken as a starting point for further reflections in the course of 
finding a decision. Thus the first question can be answered in the positive. These results rebut 
fears that VAAs lead to an “instant democracy” in which the voters deal with political 
contents and actors in a hasty and superficial fashion.  
 
In many Western countries, low or declining voter turnout can be observed. Even if it is 
clear that technological progress alone cannot increase rates of political participation, it is 
                                                          
16  This section strongly relies on a book chapter to be published later this year, see Ladner/Fivaz (forthcoming). 
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nevertheless a hope which is time and again expressed not only in connection with the 
introduction of e-voting but also in the context of the widespread use of online voting aids 
(Cedroni 2010: 256). 
 
A number of studies based on user interviews has looked into the question whether the use 
of VAAs leads to an increased participation rate. These studies all conclude that there is a 
positive effect on participation; however, the figures found differ strongly depending on 
country and study. For Finland it can be shown that the use of an online voting aid increases 
the probability that the user participates in the elections by up to 23%. For Switzerland, the 
corresponding figure is 15%, for the Netherlands it is 12% and for Germany it is 8% (Garzia 
2010 and Ladner/Pianzola 2010). 
 
On the basis of these results alone it is difficult to estimate how big an impact VAAs have 
on actual participation. The studies were based on direct interviews with users. These tend to 
overestimate the impact of VAAs when asked directly. It must also be taken into account that 
some of the users would have taken part in the elections without the VAAs. Cautious 
estimates conclude that smartvote increased the participation in 2007 in Switzerland by 0.6 to 
1.0% (Ladner/Pianzola 2010: 220). 
 
Just as for the testing runs for e-voting systems, VAAs have been shown to have a rather 
small impact on electoral participation (Ruusuvirta/Rosema 2009). An important explanation 
may have to do with the fact that these instruments are primarily preaching to the converted 
(Norris 2003). Among the VAA users those groups are overrepresented which are already 
characterised by an above average participation rate (e.g. those with a strong interest in 
politics). Even for VAAs it is difficult to persuade those who do not take part in elections to 
show an interest. Among young and first-time voters it appears to be possible to some extent 
to further their interest in politics and their electoral participation by means of online voting 
aids (Fivaz/Nadig 2010). 
 
From the perspective of the public and above all from the perspective of the parties and 
other political actors, the question of the impact of online voting aids on the electoral 
decisions of their users is, of course, of outmost importance. If this question is put directly to 
the users, it appears perfectly plausible that there is a considerable impact of VAAs on 
electoral decisions. About 70% of users interviewed stated that smartvote had directly 
influenced their decisions (Ladner et al. 2010b). This is an unusually high figure, which, 
however, mirrors the complexity of the Swiss electoral system and the far-reaching 
possibilities involved in voting compared to other countries (see next section). For this reason 
it was asked more precisely in which way the smartvote recommendation had an impact on 
the voting decision. Only 15% of those asked stated that they had adopted the 
recommendation in its entirety and copied it onto the ballot paper. The other users adopted the 
recommendation only partially. Many users stated that on the basis of the recommendation 
they voted for candidates they had previously not known and would therefore not have voted 
for. And about a third of users claimed to have consciously not voted for particular candidates 
on the basis of the recommendation received (cf. Ladner et al. 2010). 
 
In other countries the question to be asked was whether the use of VAAs had led to voting 
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for a party other than the one originally intended. The resulting figures vary strongly 
depending on the country. In the Netherlands, between 15 (Aarts/van der Kolk 2007) and 
10% of users (Kleinnijenhuis/van der Hoof 2008) claimed to have adjusted their electoral 
decisions due to the recommendation received. For Germany this figure is six per cent 
(Marschall 2005) and for Finland as low as three per cent (Mykkänen/Moring 2006). 
 
These research results are viewed rather critically by the VAA researchers themselves. A 
series of considerable methodological difficulties gives rise to justified doubts as to their 
validity. Most of the studies are based on surveys conducted before the elections. 
Correspondingly, what is captured are voting intentions and not real voting decisions. A 
second point of criticism concerns the quality of the survey data. Most studies are based on 
online surveys of VAA users.17 Such surveys can neither produce representative data for the 
entire electorate nor for Internet users. A further problem arises with respect to causality. 
Even if VAA users can be shown to vote for another party than originally planned, it cannot 
be concluded with certainty that this is due to the voting recommendation.  
 
Before we turn our attention to the latest results stemming from the 2011 Swiss national 
elections, which also address the questions whether some specific parties took advantage of 
smartvote, we have a brief glance at the Swiss electoral system and the functioning of the 
platform smartvote.  
 
3. The Swiss Electoral System and the Functioning of smartvote 
The functioning, the use and the usefulness of VAAs depend to some extent on the party 
system, the electoral system and the elections themselves. It makes a difference whether 
voters have to decide between two candidates running for presidency or whether they can 
choose among a huge number of political parties. The bigger the offer and the more 
possibilities the voters have to express their preferences the more information do they need to 
make up their minds.  
 
Switzerland is according to Lijphart (1999) and many others an almost perfect model of a 
consensus democracy. Its social and cultural heterogeneity is reflected in a highly fragmented 
party system (see Ladner 2002) supported by PR-voting as well as other elements of power 
sharing. Federalism and decentralisation additionally increase the complexity of the party 
systems. The 26 cantons vary on aspects like language, denomination and economic structure. 
Subsequently the cantonal party systems differ widely for example regarding the number of 
parties and the degree of party competition (see Ladner 2004 and 2004b). Switzerland has 
thus many parties with a relatively low share of the votes and the national parties are 
decentralised with cantonal and local sections disposing of far-reaching autonomy and 
independence. It is not unusual that on important national issues there are different political 
positions within the same national party.  
                                                          
17 Usually the users are asked on the VAA website after the recommendation is given whether they would participate in a scientific 
survey. Only few studies deviate from this pattern and use data from representative surveys of electoral research (e.g. 
Marschall/Schultze 2011 and Ladner et al. 2010). 
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Electoral districts for the national elections are the 26 cantons. The 200 seats of the 
National Council are assigned to the cantons according their population size: the six smallest 
cantons have only one seat; whereas the canton of Zurich, the largest canton, has 34 seats.  
Since the members of the national council are elected in a PR system, the entry hurdles for 
parties in bigger cantons with more seats are very low, in Zurich, for example around 3 per 
cent. This leads to a large number of parties running for office. In 2007, in the canton of 
Zurich, the voters had to decide among 29 party lists making it rather demanding to get to 
know all the parties and the differences between them.  
 
Furthermore, the electoral system is very open giving citizens the possibility to decide not 
only among parties but also among candidates. Every voter has as many votes as there are 
seats in the constituency (e.g. in the small canton of Uri with 1 seat, voters have 1 vote and in 
the much larger canton of Zurich with 34 seats they have 34 votes). Secondly, voters can split 
their votes between candidates from different parties (e.g. in the canton of Zurich a voter can 
give 4 votes to candidates from party A, 10 to candidates from party B and 20 to candidates 
from party C). This is called “Panaschieren” or split-voting. Thirdly, voters can support their 
favourite candidates by giving them two votes instead of one (so-called cumulative voting, 
e.g. in the canton of Zurich a voter could vote for 17 candidates with two votes for each). 
These rules allow for composing a customized ballot list according ones personal political 
preferences. Taking again the example of Zürich in 2007, the voters could thus elect 34 
candidates among 804 candidates running for office.  Here it is obviously more demanding to 
gather the necessary information about parties and candidates than in a two-party-system. A 
VAA for the Swiss national elections has thus at least to be able to manage the differences 
between the cantons as well as the possibilities to vote for different candidates. 
 
The core of smartvote is like in most VAAs the issue-matching module. A couple of month 
before the elections, all candidates receive the smartvote questionnaire, either by e-mail or by 
letter and they are asked to answer the questionnaire completely and to return it. The 
questionnaire consists of up to 70 questions on the most important political issues (like e.g., 
“Do you think that nuclear power plants should be shut down?”). Possible answers are “yes”, 
“rather yes”, “rather no” and “no”. Candidates do not have an opting-out possibility; they 
have to answer all questions and confirm their answers before they are saved in the smartvote 
database. Once they have confirmed their answer set it is no longer possible to change them. 
 
About six weeks before the elections the smartvote website is made accessible to the voters 
and leads them in three steps to their individual voting recommendation. First, the voters have 
to specify their political profile. They are asked to answer the same questionnaire as the 
candidates but they can choose between the “deluxe version” consisting of 73 questions in 
2007 and the “rapid version” consisting of 36 questions only. Unlike the candidates the voters 
also have a “no answer” option if they wish to leave out a number of questions and they can 
weight the answers according to the importance the issues have for them. For each question 
additional background information and explanations including pros and cons to every 
question are provided on the website. Secondly, voters have to select the constituency 
(electoral district) in which the vote, respectively for which they want to receive a voting 
recommendation. Depending on the electoral system they can also decide whether they wish 
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to receive a voting recommendation for lists/parties or for individual candidates. Finally, 
smartvote compares the answers of the voter with the answers of a candidate including the 
weighting factors the voter has given to the questions. The higher the congruence of the 
answers between a voter and a candidate, the more “congruence points” a candidate gets.  
This process is repeated over all questions and for every candidate in the selected 
constituency and results in a voting recommendation in form of a list with a decreasing 
ranking of the candidates according to their total congruence score. If a voter wishes to 
receive a voting recommendation for lists/parties the procedure is similar. Here smartvote 
uses the mean value of all answering candidates of a list or party. 
 
Additionally, smartvote provides some more features to inform the voters. The website 
contains a database with all candidates, including extensive portraits with political profile 
(smartvote questionnaire, information about their political career, their political agenda, and 
so on), and information about their personal profile (e.g., educational, professional and family 
background). The database also includes links to personal websites or to video files. The 
website provides also tools to visualize political preferences: the so-called smartspider and 
smartmap charts. Both analytical graphs are based on the candidates’ and the users’ answers 
to the smartvote questionnaire. The smartspider shows the agreement or disagreement on 
eight major political issues dimensions formulated as political goals (e.g. more law and order, 
more environmental protection, or a strong welfare state) in a spider net graph. The values on 
the eight axes range from 0 to 100 – 0 standing for complete disapproval of the formulated 
political goal and 100 for full approval. The smartmap is based on a system of coordinates 
with two major ideological cleavages serving as axes – the “north-south axis” for the cleavage 
between liberal and conservative standpoints and the “west-east axis” for the left-right 
cleavage. 
 
4. Impact of smartvote in the 2011 elections according to the users 
Based on experiences with previous elections smartvote users in the 2011 national elections 
were confronted with a whole battery of questions asking whether smartvote had an impact on 
their voting behaviour and – and this was new this time – in which direction they changed 
their voting behaviour, i.e. to which party they changed their vote to. 
 
The online survey was conducted after the elections among those users who left their 
email address on the website. About 14’000 smartvote users filled in the questionnaire.18 
Although this is a quite important number of respondents, the sample is, of course, far from 
representative with respect to the electorate or even smartvote users themselves. There are 
good reasons to believe that smartvote is more often used by a special part of the voters 
(male, younger, better educated and rather left wing) and that only a special part of these 
users (probably those particularly interested in such tools) participated in the survey. 
Whenever we want to make some general statements about the importance of smartvote or 
                                                          
18  The exact number of participants in the post-electoral survey is 14‘067 (or 21.6%) of the 65'211 contacted persons which were 
registered on the smartvote website with their own account. We do also have data from a pre-electoral survey with 6272 respondents 
which were asked about their voting intentions, 2582 out of these answered another online questionnaire after the elections. These two 
latter surveys are not taken into account in this paper. 
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about the real effects of smartvote on the elections we do have to take this double selection 
bias into account.19 We are, however, perfectly able to talk about those who belong to our 
sample. If some of them changed their voting decision after having consulted the list 
recommend by smartvote, this results in additional votes for the party recommended. What 
remains to be seen is whether the cause for a change of the voting decision can really be 
attributed to smartvote and whether they tell the truth when they claim that this was the case, 
but this problem is inherent to almost all surveys.20  
 
The results for 2011 almost perfectly match the results of previous studies. Smartvote 
helped to increase their interest in this year’s elections for about half of the users and for more 
than eighty per cent it increased their knowledge about the elections (see Table 1). Smartvote 
did not – as it has been seen before – lead to a hasty and superficial voting. On the contrary 
the users claimed that they tried to inform themselves better about specific parties or 
candidates, tried to learn more about political issues at stake or started to discuss politics with 
their colleagues, friends and their family. And about 10 per cent stated that smartvote made 
them participate in the elections. As far as their voting decision was concerned, about 60 per 
cent stated that smartvote had an influence. In most cases (about 80 per cent) smartvote made  
 
 
Table 1: How did smartvote influence the users? 
 
Impact Per cent  N=
Smartvote increased my interest in this year's 
elections (rather true, true) 
47.8  14067
Smartvote improved my knowledge about the 
elections (rather true, true) 
84.2  14067
Smartvote led me to search for more information 
about parties and candidates (rather true, true) 
53.8  14067
Smartvote led my attention to specific political 
issues (rather true, true) 
46.5  14067
Smartvote motivated me to discuss politics with 
colleagues, friends and family (rather true, true) 
57.7  14067
 
Smartvote made me participate in the elections 10.3  14067
 
Smartvote had an influence on my voting decision 60.0  13235
Smartvote made my vote for another party/list 28.5 8295
Smartvote made my vote for other candidates 78.9 8295
 
 
 
                                                          
19  One could even argue that there is a triple selection bias since those not taking part in the elections are hardly represented. 
20  For a more thorough discussion of the methodological problems implied see Pianzola/Ladner 2011, Vassil 2011.  
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them vote for different candidates. About 30 per cent of those claiming that smartvote had an 
influence on their voting decision voted for a different party.  
 
As we have seen, 60 per cent of our respondents claimed that smartvote had an influence 
on their voting decision. Now, we would like to know which groups of respondents were 
particularly influenced by smartvote. The idea behind this question is – of course – that 
somebody who has strong party ties and voted for a specific party all his life is less likely to 
be influenced by smartvote than somebody who is young and votes for the first time in his 
life. 
 
Not unexpectedly it is the younger voters which are more often influenced by smartvote in 
their voting decisions (see Table 2). The same is true for female voters. Higher education – on 
the contrary – does not seem to go hand in hand with lesser influence of smartvote. Academic 
high school compared to an apprenticeship, and university degrees compared to higher  
 
 
Table 2: Socio-demographical and attitudinal variables and the influence of smartvote on the 
voting decision 
 
Did smartvote influence your voting decision? (post electoral survey)  
Yes N  Yes N
All 60.0 13235 Political Interest  
 very interested 50.2 5014
Gender  rather interested 64.6 7010
Male 58.4 8259 rather not interested 73.8 1163
Femal 62.7 4937 not at all interested 71.4 28
   
Age  Political Knowledge  
18-35 64.2 6597 low 68.4 1193
36-50 61.0 4072 medium 61.1 6712
51-65 47.9 1926 high 56.6 5294
66+ 43.2 539   
   
Education  Close to a party  
Apprenticeship 53.7 1406 not close to a party 68.9 5304
Academic High 
School 
61.4 1584 Christian Democrats 46.3 464
 Liberals 44.8 866
Higher vocational 
education 
58.7 1125 Swiss People's Party 34.6 462
University Applied 
Sciences 
63.8 2274 Social Democrats 51.5 1284
University 60.7 4740 Greens 57.6 548
 Green Liberals 65.5 891
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vocational education reveal higher percentages of people having changed their voting 
decision after the use of smartvote. This might to some extent be surprising since one could 
expect higher education to lead to some sort of resistance against any attempts to influence 
ones voting behaviour, and now they seem to accept the suggestions made by smartvote more 
easily. 
 
As for the attitudinal variables low interest in politics, low political knowledge and no 
specific party ties lead to being more often influenced by smartvote and a change of the 
voting decision. Interesting to note that even among those revealing sympathies for a certain 
party a considerable amount states that they have been influenced by smartvote.  
 
The most important question in the course of elections is: Who gets the votes? Is there a 
specific trend to be found among the users of smartvote toward a particular party, can this 
trend be attributed to the recommendation given by smartvote, and can the proximity revealed 
through smartvote to another party be made responsible for the swing to this other party? In 
order to elucidate these questions and for a better understanding of the results we need to have 
a look at the results of the 2011 national elections first.  
 
To the surprise of quite many commentators the outcome of the elections was quite 
astonishing. The five biggest parties, the Swiss People’s Party, the Social Democrats, the 
Liberal Party, the Christian Democrats and the Green Party lost votes to two smaller parties, 
the Green Liberals and the Conservative Democratic Party.  
 
Table 3 shows those users who stated that they were influenced by smartvote in such a 
way that they voted for another party or list (we remember that this applies to 28.5 per cent of 
those voters who stated that they were influenced by smartvote or about 17 per cent of all 
users taking part in the survey). The big winner among the smartvote users was the Green 
Liberal Party with 359 additional votes; the big loser was the Liberal Party with 229 losses. 
 
Except for the Green Party the results roughly mirror the results of the elections, at least as 
far as the overall gains or losses are concerned. The Christian Democrats, the Liberal Party, 
the Swiss People’s Party and the Social Democrats are among the losers and the Green 
Liberal Party and the Conservative Democratic Party among the winners of the elections. 
What differs from the election results is the extent to which the parties gained or lost votes. 
This is due to the distortion of the sample counting much more people from the left side of the 
political spectrum. In the elections, the Swiss People’s Party and the Liberal Party lost 2.3 per 
cent of the votes, the Christian Democrats 2.2, the Green Party 1.2 and the Social Democrats 
0.8 per cent. Green Liberal Party on the other side gained 4 and the Conservative Democratic 
Party 5.4 per cent of the votes. 
 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe that smartvote was to some extent 
responsible for changing voting decisions, at least for some of the users. The absolute 
numbers we can account for seem to be rather minor, at least at first sight. The Green Liberal 
Party was supported by 131’000 voters in the 2011 national elections, our results account for 
360 additional votes. However, considering that only about 3.5 per cent of the smartvote users 
took part in the survey and assuming that the participants in the survey are somehow 
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representative for all smartvote users we could expect about 10’000 additional voters for the 
Green Liberal Party stemming from smartvote. This amounts to a bit more than 7 per cent of 
all votes the Green Liberal Party received. This figure, however, only accounts for those votes 
stemming from party lists and neglects votes stemming from single candidates being voted for 
due to smartvote and being put on another party list. The real percentage could even be 
higher. On the other hand, it might well be that the double selection bias in the sample favours 
the Green Liberal Party. Those voters who were not really satisfied with the traditional parties 
used smartvote more often in order to find a new party to vote for and those who found a new 
party were particularly motivated to take part in the survey. 
 
 
Table 3: Voting intention and vote after the use of smartvote (only voters being influenced by 
smartvote) 
 
Which party/list 
did you want to 
vote for before the 
use of smartvote? 
(absolut 
numbers/percentag
es 
Which party/list did you vote for because of smarvote?   
Christian 
Democrats 
(CVP) 
Liberal 
Party (FDP) 
Swiss 
People’s 
Party (SVP)
Social 
Democrats 
(SPS) 
Green Party 
(GPS) 
Green 
Liberal 
Party 
(GLP) 
Conservative 
Democratic 
Party (BDP) 
Vote 
losses 
Balance 
among these 
parties 
Christian 
Democrats 
(CVP) 
17 5 36 12 77 15 162 -19
10.5 3.1 22.2 7.4 47.5 9.3  
Liberal Party 
(FDP) 
46  11 15 4 192 36 304 -229
15.1  3.6 4.9 1.3 63.2 11.8  
Swiss People’s 
Party (SVP) 
15 25 5 0 32 29 106 -85
14.2 23.6 4.7 0.0 30.2 27.4  
Social 
Democrats (SPS) 
33 7 1 119 150 11 321 -96
10.3 2.2 0.3 37.1 46.7 3.4  
Green Party 
(GPS) 
7 1 0 101 62 3 174 9
4.0 0.6 0.0 58.0 35.6 1.7  
Green Liberal 
Party (GLP)  
31 20 1 64 44 23 183 359
16.9 10.9 0.5 35.0 24.0 12.6  
Conservative 
Democratic 
Party (BDP) 
11 5 3 4 4 29  56 61
19.6 8.9 5.4 7.1 7.1 51.8   
Vote gains 143 75 21 225 183 542 117 1306 0
 
 
Since smartvote and its voting recommendation is based on the concept of issue or 
proximity voting, it can be expected that those people voting for another party than previously 
planned, changed their opinion because they did have more issue similarities with the new 
party they elected than with the old party they originally intended to vote for. Whether this is 
the case can also be tested with our survey data. Ideally we should do that on the basis of the 
questions used by smartvote and the recommendation given by the tool. Unfortunately these 
data is not available yet so we have to look at the answers to eight different questions on 
political issues being asked in the survey.  
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Figure 1 compares voters that voted for the Social Democrats and the Green Liberal Party 
with such who intended to vote for the Social Democrats first and eventually switched to the 
Green Liberal Party Party. The results – if we look at the mean values for each group – show 
clearly that those who changed their mind and voted for the Green Liberal Party instead of the 
Social Democrats are positioned between the voters of the two parties. This is true for all 
eight questions. The swing voters are thus less extreme in their positions than the Social 
Democrats. They probably received a voting recommendation by smartvote directing them 
toward the Green Liberal Party and they decided to vote for this party.  
 
 
Figure 1: Average issue positions of voters changing from the Social Democrats to the Green 
Liberals after the use of smartvote 
 
 
1 = totally agree; 2 = rather agree; 3 = neither nor; 4 = rather disagree; 5 = totally disagree. N listwise Green Liberals = 2546, 
Social Democrats -> Green Liberals 139, Social Democrats = 3320  
 
 
To sum up: Smartvote – if we can believe our respondents – matters! It increases people’s 
interest in elections, motivates them to participate and makes them vote for a different party. 
In the course of the 2011 Swiss national elections smartvote most likely worked in favour of 
one specific party: the Green Liberal Party. Why this was the case, we do not know yet. It 
might well be, that this party was in this moment particularly attractive for those people using 
smartvote more often.  
 
What we do not know either is the strength of the effect smartvote has or is likely to have 
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if it was used by more people. At the moment, it is a relatively small percentage of people 
using smartvote prior to the elections and the influence of the tool is probably far from 
decisive. What will happen if a majority of the voters rely on such tools before they vote? 
There is one thing which will increase the popularity of such tools dramatically: the 
introduction of electronic voting.  
 
5. Linking VAAs with e-voting systems 
How would someone react if she or he was asked to fill in a booking form by hand or even 
appear in person at a travel agent’s after having found a holiday arrangement including flight, 
hotel and the car to rent? This is exactly what some smartvote users do today. They answer 
the smartvote questionnaire online, receive a voting recommendation and then copy the 
names of the candidates by hand onto their ballot paper. In the case of the canton of Zurich 
this can mean up to 34 names including a special code for each candidate. 
 
At the end of the 1990s Swiss Authorities decided to enhance information technologies more 
actively. One of the projects launched aimed at electronic voting. Supported by the federal 
authorities, the three cantons Geneva, Neuchâtel and Zurich started to develop their own e-
voting systems. On the grounds of their successful attempts, it was decided that electronic 
voting should be introduced stepwise and rather slowly in the years to come all over 
Switzerland. In the course of the 2011 national elections Swiss citizens living abroad had for 
the first time the possibility to take part in elections electronically. This endeavour was 
limited to five cantons only.  
 
What has been disappointing so far was the rather low number of people using electronic 
voting and the modest impact on electoral turnout. What might be responsible for this lack of 
impact is the fact that e-voting does not create a real added value. It is not necessarily faster 
and simpler than postal voting, which is the standard way of voting in Switzerland.  
 
If voters could rely on an intelligent program helping them to select their parties and 
candidates by producing a ballot like selection which could then be sent to the polls 
electronically, this would change everything. It can be assumed that such a tool would 
become very popular and would be used by a majority of the voters in no time. Electronic 
voting would replace postal voting.21 
 
A linking of the act of choosing with the act of voting seems perfectly obvious from a 
process-oriented point of view. But what will be the consequences for electoral campaigns 
and for political parties? Are there ways of influencing the voting recommendation given by 
VAAs? For these reasons, scientists should address early on the challenges of such a step. 
Since VAAs have, as I have tried to show in this paper – an impact on electoral decisions, 
they will become a very decisive element in the course of elections. 
 
                                                          
21  For those who don’t believe in electronic voting, they could simply print out the list the candidates selected, sign it, and send it to the 
polls by ordinary mail. 
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